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COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE v. HAWKS: WHY FEDERAL
COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO RECOGNIZE AND
ENFORCE TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENTS AGAINST
NONMEMBERS “BECAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN
TRIBES”*
Heath Albert**
I. Introduction
Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River are long, winding bodies of
water found in Northwest Idaho.1 To the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, these waters
are sacred and foundational to the Tribe’s culture.2 The lake and river make
up part of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe Reservation and are partially owned by
the Tribe. 3 Because of the great reverence with which it views Lake Coeur
d’Alene and the St. Joe River, the Tribe goes to great lengths to preserve
the environmental integrity of the water. 4 For example, the Tribe regulates
the structural encroachments, such as private docks, on tribal waters.5
At issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks was an encroachment on the
St. Joe River placed by a husband and wife, the Hawkses, who are not
members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.6 Since the Hawkses did not follow
tribal ordinances when installing a boat garage on the lake, the Tribe sued
* Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019).
** Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Many thanks to
Professor Liesa Richter of the University of Oklahoma College of Law for her invaluable
advice and support during the writing of this Note.
1. See Lake Management, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/lake/
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020); see Saint Joe River, IDAHO DEP’ T OF FISHING & GAME,
https://idfg.idaho.gov/ifwis/fishingplanner/water/1168011474569 (last visited Sept. 19,
2020).
2. See Goals of Regulation, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribensn.gov/lake/shoreline-protection/goals-of-regulation/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
3. See Map of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE,
https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/nr/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/01/fishfeereg.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2020); see History, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribensn.gov/our-tribe/history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
4. Lake Management, supra note 1.
5. Shoreline Protection, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/
lake/shoreline-protection/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
6. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2019).
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the couple in Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court.7 The tribal court entered a
default judgment against the Hawkses because they failed to appear to
defend against the Tribe’s claims. 8 To ensure the removal of the violating
encroachment, the Tribe filed a complaint in federal court seeking
recognition and enforcement of the tribal court judgment. 9
When a court recognizes a judgment from another jurisdiction, it gives
the outside judgment “the same effect that [the judgment] has in the
[jurisdiction] where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject
matter of the action and the issues involved.”10 A judgment from another
jurisdiction is enforced when the prevailing party is given the relief granted
by the court that originally rendered the judgment in the matter. 11 This Note
considers whether federal courts have the power, or jurisdiction, to hear a
recognition and enforcement case such as Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks.
This discussion does not venture far into whether, and under what
circumstances, a court should recognize a tribal court judgment. Instead, the
main focus remains on whether an “action to recognize and enforce a tribal
court’s award against nonmembers of the tribe” 12 is appropriate for
resolution in the federal courts.
Part I has served to broadly introduce Couer d’Alene Tribe and
recognition and enforcement suits. Parts II and III of this Note discuss the
foundational legal principles necessary to understand the analysis in Coeur
d’Alene Tribe; particularly, these sections consider the subject matter
jurisdiction requirements of federal courts and the process by which a
foreign judgment may be recognized in a new forum. Part IV provides the
significant caselaw established on this issue before Coeur d’Alene Tribe. In
Parts V and VI, this Note explains the Ninth Circuit’s holding, assesses the
court’s reasoning, and considers the implications of the decision. Finally,
Part VII concludes that federal courts are authorized to recognize and
enforce tribal court judgments against nonmember defendants.

7.
8.
9.
10.
1971).
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. ch. 5, topic 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST.
Id.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1053.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss1/5

No. 1]

NOTES

169

II. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
While state courts in the United States have broad jurisdiction to hear
most kinds of legal disputes, federal courts have only limited jurisdiction. 13
Federal courts do not have general authority to make valid, legal judgments
in many types of cases.14 Among a few other categories of cases, the U.S.
Constitution grants authority to the Supreme Court to preside over cases
“arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made . . . under their Authority.” 15 In addition to the power given
to the Supreme Court, the Constitution further devises power to the
congressional branch “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court.”16 Therefore, Congress established the federal district and appellate
courts17 and established the types of cases in which these federal courts can
exercise jurisdiction.18 Federal district courts have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear most cases because of two federal statutes: 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1332. 19 Section 1331 authorizes federal courts to make rulings
in cases involving federal law. 20 The other main jurisdictional authorization,
§ 1332, permits federal courts to rule in cases involving U.S. citizens from
different states, commonly called diversity jurisdiction. 21 This Note focuses
on the first-mentioned jurisdictional authorization in § 1331: federal
question jurisdiction.
Cases considered “federal questions” involve claims that arise “under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”22 In American Well
Works v. Layne, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes provided a useful test to
determine whether a suit arises under federal law; specifically, he reasoned
that a federal question “arises under the law that creates the cause of
action.”23 Thus, claims that properly invoke federal question jurisdiction are
created by federal law.24 While this test is useful, it is not the only option a
13. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
14. See id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 132; 28 U.S.C. § 43.
18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
19. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331–1332.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
21. See id. § 1332.
22. Id. § 1331.
23. Am. Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
24. See id.
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court has to resolve the issue of federal question jurisdiction. 25 Another
standard the Supreme Court has offered for federal question analysis is
whether the case raises a substantial question of federal law. 26 This standard
was established in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., where a
shareholder sued Kansas City Title & Trust to prevent it from violating its
corporate charter.27 The company planned to invest in federal securities
recently authorized by Congress.28 The shareholder claimed that the
company’s intended investment would cause misappropriation of corporate
funds because the federal securities were invalidly authorized.29 The
shareholder argued that Congress lacked authority to create these securities,
and thus any investment in them by Kansas City Title & Trust would
constitute a misappropriation of corporate funds.30 The Supreme Court
ruled that the federal courts had proper subject matter jurisdiction because,
while the plaintiff’s claim was created by state law, the shareholder could
succeed only if he established that a congressional act violated the
Constitution.31 The Court held that, to satisfy the substantial question
standard, the question of federal law must be necessary to the plaintiff’s
claim for relief.32
A plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law only if the issue of federal
law appears on the face of the well-pleaded complaint.33
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of
action shows that it is based upon those laws or that
Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some
anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the
defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of
25. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Gunn v. Minton, 568
U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue
is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”).
26. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
27. Id. at 201–02.
28. Id. at 201.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 199–202.
32. Id.; see also Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization,
858 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988).
33. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 17
(1983).
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the United States. Although such allegations show that very
likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the
Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is,
the plaintiff’s original cause of action, arises under the
Constitution.34
This precept is known as the well-pleaded complaint rule.35 Given
jurisdictional restraints, it is vital for a plaintiff seeking relief in federal
court to clearly establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; if the court
decides at any phase of the proceedings it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
it must dismiss the case. 36
III. Territorial Limitation of Legal Judgments and Enforcement
in Foreign Forums
Courts, whether state, federal, or tribal, have the power to make rulings
only within the legal authority granted by the sovereign they serve. 37 “No
legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived.”38 Of course, the physical
limitations of a sovereign government are its territorial borders. 39 While a
government’s laws may be freely applied outside of its territory by the
courts of other sovereigns, judicial rulings are limited to a sovereign’s
physical territory.40 “No sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own
territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial
decision. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere
nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any other
tribunals.”41
Legal judgments come in various forms. In the most basic sense, a legal
judgment is an order that must be satisfied by or executed against a person,
34. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
35. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
37. See Baskin v. Montedonico, 115 F.2d 837, 838 (6th Cir. 1940).
38. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
39. John Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in
Contemporary World Politics, 95 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437, 437
(2005) (“Implicit in all claims about state sovereignty as the quintessential form taken by
political authority are associated claims about distinguishing a strictly bounded territory
from an external world and thus fixing the territorial scope of sovereignty.”).
40. See Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908); see also Baskin, 115 F.2d at
838.
41. Baskin, 115 F.2d at 838 (citations omitted).
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entity, or property. One important fundamental principle of legal judgments
against defendants in civil cases is that they presuppose property within the
court’s jurisdiction to satisfy such judgments. 42 When a defendant lacks
recoverable assets within the court’s jurisdiction, the court cannot extend its
reach to seize those assets located outside its jurisdiction. 43 “Enforcement of
a judgment . . . does not become possible until the defendant or the
defendant’s property can be found within the enforcing forum . . . .”44
So, what is a plaintiff to do after a valid judgment is entered against a
defendant who is not present and has no property or recoverable assets in
the ruling court’s jurisdiction? In this scenario, a plaintiff must locate the
jurisdiction that has the authority to enforce an identical judgment against
the defendant.45 Once the proper forum is located, the plaintiff must file a
new lawsuit to domesticate and enforce the judgment, unless an existing
treaty or law binds the new forum to honor the judgment. 46 The new forum
will review the original judgment to assess its authenticity and the
consequences of enforcing it against the defendant. 47
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires state
courts to recognize and enforce judgments from courts sitting in other states
as long as the ruling court had proper jurisdiction. 48 However, federal courts
have determined that tribal courts are not afforded full faith and credit
under the U.S. Constitution and other federal statutes.49 Thus, tribal court
judgments are not automatically recognized, regardless of their
jurisdiction.50 Instead, federal courts review tribal court judgments under
the doctrine of comity.51
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another.
42. George Rutherglen & James Y. Stern, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES
LEGAL SYSTEM 13, 14–15 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014).
43. See id. at 15.
44. Id. at 14.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id.
48. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28
U.S.C. § 1738.
49. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Full faith and credit is
not extended to tribal judgments by the Constitution or Congressional act, and we decline to
extend it judicially.”).
50. Id. at 810.
51. Id.
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It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and
expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and
accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an
imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation’s expression of
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons
protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when
its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of
the nation called upon to give it effect. 52
Federal courts will never recognize tribal court judgments if the tribal court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or “if the
defendant was not afforded due process of law.” 53 Comity is also the
method the Supreme Court decided federal courts should use to determine
whether to enforce a judgment from a court in a foreign country. 54 This
doctrine gives courts broad discretion in ruling on the enforcement of
foreign judgments; even if the foreign judgment is one which is usually
enforced in the United States, a court is not necessarily bound to enforce
it.55
IV. Significant Law Before Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the particular issue presented in
Coeur d’Alene Tribe and discussed in this Note; however, the Court’s
holding in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribes of
Indians in 1985 is instructive in determining whether federal courts have
the power to enforce tribal court judgments against nonmembers of the
tribe.56 Before the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, only two
U.S. Courts of Appeals had addressed whether there is federal question
jurisdiction for actions of recognition and enforcement of tribal court
judgments against nonmembers.
Federal diversity jurisdiction was not available in Coeur d’Alene Tribe
because Indian tribes, even those that are federally recognized, are not

52. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
53. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE
UNITED STATES § 482 (AM. L. INST. 1986)).
54. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
55. Rutherglen & Stern, supra note 42, at 20.
56. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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citizens of any U.S. state.57 Thus, federal courts must make the preliminary
determination of whether there is jurisdiction in tribal court judgment
recognition cases based upon a finding of an issue of federal law. In
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co., the
Eleventh Circuit held that suits for recognition of tribal court judgments
implicate no federal issue. 58 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in MacArthur v.
San Juan County disagreed and ruled that an issue of federal law does exist
in these kinds of recognition suits.59
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe deems its sovereignty as inherent and endowed
by its Creator.60 “Tribal Sovereignty flows through American history in a
timeless river, without beginning or end.” 61 The federal government did not
create tribal authority, but it nonetheless endures at the will of Congress. 62
Today, “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.”63 Thus, to determine the legitimacy of any exercise
of tribal authority over a nonmember, courts must examine the aspects of
sovereignty the tribe has retained. 64
A. National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians
In National Farmers, the Supreme Court held that, since federal law
circumscribes tribal sovereignty, the question of whether a tribe properly
exercised its civil jurisdiction over nonmembers raised a federal question.
This case concerned the validity of a tribal court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over parties who were not members of the ruling tribe.65 A member of the
Crow Tribe sued a Montana school district in tribal court to recover
damages he suffered after he was struck by a motorcycle in the school
57. Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.
2002) (“First, as dependent domestic sovereign nations, Indian tribes are not state citizens.
Second, despite ample opportunity, Congress has not seen fit to confer state citizenship on
Indian tribes. Finally, because our holding is consistent with every other circuit to address
this issue, we advance the interest of uniformity in a uniquely federal area of law.”).
58. 607 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010).
59. 497 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007).
60. Sovereignty, COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, https://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/our-tribe/
sovereignty (last visited Jan 3, 2020).
61. Id.
62. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
63. Id.
64. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56
(1985).
65. Id. at 852.
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parking lot.66 The land on which the injury occurred is within the Crow
Tribe Reservation, but is owned by the State of Montana. 67 The school
district never appeared in the tribal court action and, consequently, the
Crow Tribal Court entered a default judgment in favor of the Tribe
member.68 To prevent the execution of this judgment, the school district and
its insurer filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana arguing that the Crow Tribal Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over an accident occurring on non-tribal land. 69 The
court eventually granted a permanent injunction against the execution of the
tribal court judgment.70 It held the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the
tort because the injury did not occur on tribal land and Congress did not
delegate to the Crow Tribal Court the power to hear this case. 71
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and, ironically,
concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render
the permanent injunction.72 The Ninth Circuit’s decision rested first on the
determination that tribal courts are not constrained by the Fourteenth
Amendment; thus, the school district’s due process and equal protection
claims did not arise under the Constitution. 73 Next, the court discussed
whether the school district’s claim that the tribal court violated the Indian
Civil Rights Act,74 conferred federal question jurisdiction. 75 “The ICRA
requires tribal courts to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with due process and equal protection.” 76 The Supreme Court, however, has
determined that “[a] civil suit to enjoin violations of the ICRA is not
cognizable in federal court.”77 Refusing to follow the school district’s
contentions, the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether a tribal
court has violated its adjudicatory authority does not raise an issue of
federal common law, implicating federal question jurisdiction. 78
66. Id. at 847.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 848–49.
70. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 560 F. Supp. at 218.
71. See id. at 217.
72. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 849.
73. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1984).
74. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341.
75. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 736 F.2d at 1322.
76. Id. at 1322–23 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8)).
77. Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 463 U.S. 49, 67–70 (1978)).
78. Id. at 1323.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that assessing
the validity of Indian Tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers “involves a
careful examination of Tribal sovereignty and the extent to which that
sovereignty has been divested.”79 It further asserted that federal law divests
the Crow Tribe of the sovereignty supporting its default judgment. 80 The
Court agreed in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens.81 Stevens reasoned
that, since federal law “defines the outer boundaries of an Indian tribe’s
power over non-Indians,” it must be analyzed to determine whether an
Indian tribal court has properly exercised its civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers.82 Therefore, the Court found that the federal district court had
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether the
Crow Tribal Court exceeded its jurisdictional authorization when it
rendered its default judgment. 83 The Court stated that all tribal court
remedies must be exhausted before a federal district court will have
jurisdiction to make any determination or grant any remedy. 84 As a result,
the case was remanded to the district court for a determination of whether
all Crow Tribal Court remedies were exhausted. 85
B. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co.
In 2010, in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Kraus-Anderson
Construction Co., the Eleventh Circuit heard a case brought to the federal
courts by a plaintiff-tribe seeking recognition and enforcement of a tribal
court judgment.86 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians involved a contract dispute
between the Miccosukee Tribe and a company hired to construct multiple
buildings on the Tribe’s reservation. 87 Unlike National Farmers, where the
party that first introduced the tribal court judgment to the U.S federal courts
was seeking protection from its execution, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
involved a tribe seeking domestication and enforcement of a tribal court
judgment. 88 The Tribe originally sued the company in Miccosukee Tribal
79. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845 (1985) (No. 84-320), 1985 WL 670173, at *7.
80. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852–53
(1985).
81. Id. at 847–53.
82. Id. at 851–52.
83. Id. at 857.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 607 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 1270–72.
88. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 848.
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Court and, after a sixteen day bench trial, the tribal court ruled for the Tribe
and awarded it $1,654,988.88 in damages. 89 The construction company then
exhausted the available review process through an appeal that was denied
by the Miccosukee Business Council. 90
Because the construction company refused to pay the award, the Tribe
sued in federal court to enforce and recover on the tribal court judgment. 91
The district court held that an Indian tribe’s claim for the federal
recognition of tribal court judgments presents a question of federal common
law, so the court had proper subject matter jurisdiction. 92 But the court
refused to recognize and enforce the tribal court judgment under the
doctrine of comity “because the Business Council was an interested party in
the litigation and its disallowance of [the construction company’s] appeal
constituted a denial of due process.”93
The Tribe appealed the district court decision to the Eleventh Circuit. 94
At the outset of every federal appeal, an appellate court will assess whether
the trial court had valid jurisdiction to render the decision on appeal. 95 Even
if the parties agree that federal subject matter jurisdiction is present, as in
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the appellate court must confirm Congress has
authorized the lower court to hear the particular suit.96 In fulfillment of this
obligation, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provided
no basis for federal jurisdiction over the Miccosukee Tribe’s suit; thus, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the case should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 97 The court recognized that the Supreme Court in
National Farmers found an issue of federal law in a case where the tribal
court’s jurisdiction was at issue.98 But the Eleventh Circuit distinguished
National Farmers on the basis that the Miccosukee Tribe and the non-tribal
defendant agreed the tribal court possessed valid jurisdiction to make its
judgment. 99 The Tribe was only willing to waive its sovereign immunity if
the construction company agreed to adjudicate all claims in the Miccosukee
Tribal Court System; thus, the contract contained a forum selection
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 607 F.3d at 1271–72.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)).
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 607 F.3d at 1275–77.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
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provision. 100 The court reasoned that the issue of tribal sovereignty—the
basis for federal question jurisdiction in National Farmers—was not
present in this case.101 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “[a] suit to
domesticate a tribal judgment does not state a claim under federal law,
whether statutory or common law.” 102
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that suits brought to federal court
to enforce tribal court judgments present a federal issue sufficient to
support the exercise of jurisdiction.103 This is especially true “in cases
encompassing the federal question whether a tribal court has exceeded its
lawful limits of jurisdiction involving an exercise of civil subject-matter
jurisdiction.”104 In such cases, “the federal district court is empowered to
review a tribal court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”105 In the Tenth
Circuit, tribal court judgments are reviewed under the doctrine of comity. 106
The court analyzes whether to extend comity to the tribal court judgment,
but has held that under two conditions the court can never extend comity:
(1) when the tribal court lacked proper jurisdiction (personal or subject
matter), or (2) when the tribal court failed to afford due process of law to
the party against whom the judgment was asserted. 107
C. Wilson v. Marchington
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit examined “whether, and under what
circumstances, a tribal court tort judgment is entitled to recognition in the
United States Courts.”108 Wilson v. Marchington involved a negligence suit
brought by a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe against a nonmember. 109
At issue in Wilson was an automobile accident which occurred on a
Montana state highway within the Blackfeet Indian Tribe Reservation
when, while the plaintiff was attempting to turn left and exit the highway,
the defendant maneuvered his tractor trailer to pass the plaintiff on her
left. 110 Having sustained significant injuries, the tribe member plaintiff sued

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2007)
Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id.
MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id.
Id.
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the truck driver and his employer in the Blackfeet Indian Tribal Court. 111
Explicitly reserving all jurisdictional objections, the defendants appeared in
the tribal court action to defend against the plaintiff’s claims. 112 Ultimately,
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 113 After multiple appeals at the
tribal court level, the plaintiff then brought the tribal court verdict to federal
court to be recognized and enforced. 114 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
the defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 115
Without expressly identifying the issue of federal law that would support
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit rendered judgments on the merits. 116 First, the Ninth Circuit
declined to extend the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
recognize tribal court judgments; the court noted that such an extension
would be proper only if done legislatively. 117 Instead, the court ruled that
tribal court judgments should be reviewed and, if appropriate, recognized in
U.S. federal courts under the doctrine of comity. 118
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry in virtually every federal examination of a
tribal judgment.”119 Ultimately, the tribal court subject matter analysis led
the court to refuse the enforcement of the judgment.120 Under Supreme
Court precedent, tribal courts do not have authority to make judgments
against nonmembers in cases involving automobile accidents on state
highways, even if the accident occurred within an Indian reservation. 121
Because the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
denied the recognition and enforcement of the judgment in favor of the
Blackfeet Indian Tribe member.122
111. See id.
112. Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. Mont. 1995).
113. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 805; see Wilson, 934 F. Supp. 1176.
117. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 811.
120. Id. at 815.
121. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (“[T]ribal courts may not
entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a
statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway
in question.”).
122. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 815.
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V. Statement of the Case: Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with over
2190 enrolled members that once claimed over 3.5 million acres of what is
now northern Idaho. 123 Today, the Tribe’s sovereign authority spans over a
345,000-acre reservation.124 Within the Coeur d’Alene Reservation are
portions of land submerged by Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River. 125
The Tribe expresses great interest in preserving and protecting its waters. 126
It states the intent behind its water regulation this way:
Although the Coeur d’Alene Tribe has the right of exclusive use
and occupancy and to exclude non-Tribal member uses of the
waters and submerged lands within the Reservation, the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe may permit non-Tribal members the privilege to
use these waters and submerged lands in certain specific, welldefined ways. This non-Tribal member use is by permission only
and is to be narrowly construed. 127
Steve and Deanne Hawks, who are not members of the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, own property along the submerged land possessed by the Tribe. 128
Without the consent of the Tribe, the Hawkses installed a boat garage that
extended from their property into the river. 129 According to the Tribe, the
Hawkses directly violated Coeur d’Alene tribal law, which prohibits “[a]ll
encroachments on Tribal submerged lands and waters . . . unless there is a
solid permit and lease currently in effect for the encroachment.” 130 The
Tribe sued the Hawkses in Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court for violating the
tribal law. 131 The Hawkses failed to appear before the tribal court;
consequently, the tribal court entered a default judgment against them. 132
The judgment charged the Hawkses with a $3900 penalty and declared the
Tribe had authority to remove the boat garage. 133
123. History, supra note 3; Idaho v. United States, 553 U.S. 262, 265 (2001).
124. History, supra note 3.
125. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2019).
126. Lake Management, supra note 1.
127. COEUR D’ALENE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. 44-1.01, https://www.cdatribensn.gov/lake/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2020/03/Chapter-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGK2N5CA].
128. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054.
129. Id.
130. COEUR D’ALENE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. 44-8.01(D)(1).
131. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The Coeur d’Alene Tribe, seeking federal recognition and enforcement
of the tribal court judgment, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Idaho.134 It was then, for the first time, that the Hawkses
appeared to defend themselves by moving to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.135 They argued the Tribe’s federal suit did not place
tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty at issue; instead, the couple argued, the
Tribe was only seeking federal enforcement of a tribal judgment. 136 It was
the Hawkses’ position that a federal court would have the authority granted
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to rule on an issue of tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember defendants, but the analysis for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s
federal claim would not involve such an issue because all the Tribe sought
was recognition and enforcement of a judgment. 137 The district court agreed
and, “[h]aving found ‘no federal statute or law . . . in dispute,’ the district
court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 138 In
support of its ruling, the court relied heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.139 Just like the Eleventh Circuit
held, it was the district court’s position that there could be a federal issue in
cases involving tribal court judgments only if the tribal court’s jurisdiction
is challenged by one party.140
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe appealed to the Ninth Circuit.141 The issue on
appeal was “whether the grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 encompasses an action to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s
award against nonmembers of the tribe.” 142 On appeal, the Tribe abandoned
enforcement of the Hawkses’ $3900 judgment because the fine was penal in
nature, and courts do not impose the penal laws of another sovereign. 143
The Tribe, however, still sought the recognition and enforcement of the
ruling of the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court judgment that entitled the Tribe to
remove the Hawkses’ encroaching boat garage. 144
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay at 3, Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks,
933 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 2:16-cv-00366-BLW), 2016 WL 9344143.
137. Id.
138. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, No.
2:16-CV-366-BLW, 2017 WL 3699347, at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2017)).
139. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 2017 WL 3699347, at *2.
140. Id.
141. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1054.
142. Id. at 1053.
143. Id. at 1054 n.2.
144. Id. at 1054.
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Judge Richard Clifton authored the decision for the Ninth Circuit. From
the outset of the opinion, Judge Clifton recognized the court’s limited
jurisdiction and inability to expand such jurisdiction by way of judicial
decree. 145 The party asserting jurisdiction must convince the court that the
case at hand properly fits into the few categories Congress has authorized
federal courts to adjudicate; the court will always begin its analysis with a
presumption that the present case is outside its limited jurisdiction. 146 Since
there is no constitutional provision or federal statute that creates the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe’s claim for the recognition and enforcement of its judgment
against the Hawkses, it was the Tribe’s burden to prove that the district
court and the Ninth Circuit had the authority to make valid judgments. 147
Therefore, the Tribe had to establish that the case “depend[ed] on the
necessary presence of a substantial question of federal law.”148
The court accordingly examined whether the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s
claim necessarily depended on an issue of federal law. 149 A substantial issue
of federal law does not exist based merely on the involvement of a federal
Indian tribe in litigation.150 Further, the Supreme Court has clarified there is
no “general ‘federal common law of Indian affairs.’”151 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit needed to “articulate a specific rule of federal common law under
which the Tribe’s case arises” to identify a substantial issue of federal law
that would support the exercise of jurisdiction. 152
To satisfy this standard, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe proffered a rule of
federal common law under which its claim arose: congressional limitations
on tribal sovereignty over nonmembers. 153 Tribal authority was not created
by federal law and “[a]t one time [tribes] exercised virtually unlimited
power over their own members as well as those who were permitted to join
their communities.”154 But throughout the history of the United States,
Congress has placed limits on Indian tribes’ sovereignty and, today, “the
145. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1055 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983)).
149. Id. at 1055–56.
150. Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221,
1225–26 (9th Cir. 1989).
151. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1055 (quoting Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute-Shoshone
Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
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power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary.” 155
Since federal law constrains and circumscribes the outer boundaries of
Indian tribal authority over nonmembers, 156 “the question of ‘whether a
tribal court has adjudicative authority over nonmembers is a federal
question.’”157
The Hawkses countered by arguing the district court’s dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction was proper for two reasons: (1) because the
couple did not challenge the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court’s jurisdiction, and
(2) because the Tribe did not seek a declaration by the district court that the
tribal court properly exercised its jurisdiction. 158 Thus, the Hawkses
attacked the Tribe’s assertion that this recognition and enforcement suit
presented a substantial issue of federal law. 159 Since the tribal court’s
jurisdiction to render its default judgment against the Hawkses was not
disputed, the Hawkses’ claim cannot be the source of the federal issue that
supports subject matter jurisdiction. 160
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. 161
The court held that “the Tribe’s action to enforce the Tribal Court’s
judgment against a nonmember presents a substantial issue of federal
law.”162 The Tribe’s federal action depended entirely on the determination
of whether applying tribal law in the ruling against the Hawkses was
proper, given the limits placed by Congress on the Tribe’s sovereignty over
nonmembers.163 “[A] federal question inhered in the Tribe’s complaint
because in order to impose its policy, embodied in a declaration by its
judiciary, it will inevitably be forced to establish its authority to do so under
federal common or statutory law.”164
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe was “‘pressing the outer boundaries’ of its
authority over nonmembers” when it applied Coeur d’Alene Tribal Law to

155. Id.
156. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1055–56; Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S.
at 851.
157. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam.
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008)).
158. Appellee’s Brief at 8, Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052 (2019) (No.
17-35755), 2017 WL 6550777 at *8.
159. Id. at 7–8, 2017 WL 6550777, at *7–8.
160. Id. at 8, 2017 WL 6550777, at *8.
161. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1057.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1058.
164. Id. at 1060.
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the Hawkses. 165 The Tribe further tested these boundaries when it sought
federal recognition and enforcement of its tribal court judgment against the
Hawkses. 166 As the Supreme Court clarified in National Farmers, federal
law defines the confines of tribal authority over nonmembers. 167
Determining tribal court jurisdiction is an incredibly complex task that
requires courts to assess the implications of numerous legal and political
actions taken by the federal government. 168
[T]he existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to
which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished,
as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative
or judicial decisions. 169
To determine whether the district court should recognize and enforce the
tribal court judgment, it is first necessary to determine whether the Tribe
proceeded appropriately within these limits of tribal sovereignty over
nonmembers set by federal law.170 The Ninth Circuit placed a limitation on
further application of the holding in Coeur d’Alene Tribe by confining the
holding to the facts presented: “a tribe seeking to enforce a tribal court
judgment against a nonmember.”171
VI. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Coeur d’Alene Tribe is sound and
should be followed in all federal courts. Further, at least two of the
justifications for federal question jurisdiction—“experience . . . and hope of
uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues”172—are satisfied by
165. Id. at 1059 (citing Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir.
1989)) (internal citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
168. Id. at 855–56.
169. Id.
170. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1059.
171. Id. at 1060.
172. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
The justification offered by the Supreme Court but absent here is solicitude: the belief that a
federal court approaches federal claims with greater care than would a state court. John F.
Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
247, 287 (2007). While federal courts are an optimal forum for tribal court judgment
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the federal courts’ exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over cases in
which tribes seek recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments
against nonmembers. Assuring the consideration of these tribal court
judgments in federal court will simultaneously legitimize tribal court
proceedings and protect nonmembers from potentially unfair tribal court
proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit correctly found a federal issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe
because resolving the Tribe’s claim requires a complex survey of the
history and relationship between the federal government and the Tribe.
Here, the court looked beyond the label of the Tribe’s claim—a judgment
recognition suit—to the actual task the court had to undertake to rule on the
claim. Federal courts determine whether tribal court judgments will be
recognized under the doctrine of comity. 173 Before a court can extend
comity to a tribal court judgment, it must first conclude that the tribal court
had both subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.174 This analysis will necessarily involve an
examination of how much sovereignty the Coeur d’Alene Tribe retains over
nonmembers. Because federal law defines the outer limits of tribal authority
over nonmembers, federal law will be the focal point of this examination. 175
Thus, a federal issue sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional authorization in
28 U.S.C. § 1331 is present in Coeur d’Alene Tribe and will be present in
future suits for the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments
against nonmembers.
Perhaps an effective manner to assess the reasoning in Coeur d’Alene
Tribe is to contrast the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning with the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians. Both decisions discuss the
consequential holding in National Farmers; however, the two Circuit
Courts of Appeals disagree as to the appropriate scope of the Supreme
Court’s holding. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s
holding in National Farmers narrowly, while the Ninth Circuit opted for a
broader interpretation. 176 Even though the facts of these two cases are not
identical, both cases involve a tribe seeking the recognition and
recognition suits, state courts are able to fairly and carefully review tribal court judgment
recognition suits. See, e.g., Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho 2017).
173. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
174. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 482
(AM. L. INST. 1986)).
175. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
176. Compare Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 933 F.3d at 1059, with Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).
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enforcement of a tribal court judgment. The most consequential difference
between the cases is the conditional forum selection clause in Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians.
The Eleventh Circuit described the decision in National Farmers as
holding “that a dispute over tribal court jurisdiction is considered a dispute
over tribal sovereignty, and therefore—like a dispute over tribal
sovereignty—is a matter of federal law to which § 1331 applies.”177 Since
the parties in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians agreed to resolve their disputes
in tribal court, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned there was no dispute over
tribal court jurisdiction, and thus no federal issue.178 By requiring a dispute
between the parties over the tribal court’s jurisdiction, the court seems to
implicitly conclude that the parties in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians could
enlarge the power of tribal courts, including tribal authority over
nonmembers, by contractually agreeing to litigate in the tribal court
systems. This contradicts the Supreme Court’s declaration that tribal
authority over nonmembers is defined by federal law. 179
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the Ninth Circuit properly applied a lessconstrained interpretation of the holding in National Farmers. The Supreme
Court articulated that “[t]he question whether an Indian tribe retains the
power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to
federal law and is a ‘federal question’ under § 1331.”180 The Ninth Circuit
accurately decided this question must be answered regardless of which
party makes the first move to bring the tribal court judgment to the attention
of a federal court. Further, the Ninth Circuit realized that the question from
National Farmers must still be answered even if the parties agree, or at
least do not dispute, that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction to render
the judgment.
The Supreme Court, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing, provided the justifications for the
jurisdictional authorization in § 1331.181 These justifications show that
while many state courts can properly adjudicate federal claims, a federal
forum for these claims is optimal. First, federal question jurisdiction is
necessary because federal forums possess greater experience analyzing and

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 607 F.3d at 1275.
Id.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852.
Id.
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
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applying federal law.182 Experience and expertise in applying federal law is
vital for tribal court judgment recognition suits because the process for
determining whether a tribal court judgment should be enforced under the
doctrine of comity involves an extremely complex analysis of federal
statutes, treaties, and administrative law. 183 Federal courts are in the best
position to make these convoluted analyses of federal law because of the
accrued experience of deciding federal claims. 184 Federal question
jurisdiction is also necessary for the “hope of uniformity that a federal
forum offers on federal issues.”185 State courts and their judges greatly
outnumber their federal counterparts; “[t]he judiciaries of fifty states (plus
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) are, it is argued, likely to spawn
greater interpretive variance than the thirteen U.S. courts of appeals.”186
Although there is not current uniformity among the three federal circuits
regarding claims such as Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s, there is much greater
potential for realizing this “hope of uniformity” 187 in the federal court
system. A uniform approach to the recognition of tribal court judgments
will promote equal treatment of Indian tribes throughout the United States.
Consistent and equal treatment of tribes is crucial for the continued
legitimacy of tribal sovereignty for all tribes.
Under National Farmers, nonmember defendants may challenge tribal
court judgments in federal court.188 The Supreme Court has established that
such a claim presents an issue of federal law to satisfy § 1331.189 By ruling
that the recognition and enforcement claim in Coeur d’Alene Tribe
presented a substantial issue of federal law, the Ninth Circuit avoided a
legal injustice to the Tribe. This legal injustice, which is currently present in
182. See id.
183. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 855–56.
184. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333
(1988) (“No matter how broadly we are willing to extend state court authority to adjudicate
federal rights, it is difficult to imagine that such matters will—or should—consume a
substantial proportion of a state court’s docket. It is likely, then, that most of the state court’s
efforts will be devoted to state law, rather than federal law matters. The exact opposite is
true for the federal courts. Therefore, federal courts will have a greater expertise in federal
substantive law than will state courts.”).
185. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc., 545 U.S. at 312.
186. Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 107 (2009).
187. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc., 545 U.S. at 312.
188. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 857.
189. Id.
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the Eleventh Circuit, rears itself by granting nonmember defendants like the
Hawkses access to the federal courts to challenge a tribal court judgment
while shutting the doors of the federal courts to Indian tribes, preventing
them from bringing a parallel claim seeking recognition of the same tribal
court judgment. One of the foundational principles of the federal judicial
system is equality of access to the federal courts for all parties in a legal
matter.190 As Justice Joseph Story stated in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee:
The constitution of the United States was designed for the
common and equal benefit of all the people of the United States.
The judicial power was granted for the same benign and salutary
purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of
parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national
forum, but also for the protection of defendants who might be
entitled to try their rights, or assert their priviliges [sic], before
the same forum. Yet, if the construction contended for be
correct, it will follow, that as the plaintiff may always elect the
state court, the defendant may be deprived of all the security
which the constitution intended in aid of his rights. Such a state
of things can, in no respect, be considered as giving equal
rights.191
By avoiding this legal injustice, the Ninth Circuit ensured that all parties
share equal rights to a federal forum in suits involving tribal court
judgments against nonmember defendants. Equal access to federal courts is
imperative for a fair and just judicial system and is accomplished by the
decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
The Ninth Circuit’s Coeur d’Alene Tribe decision will have numerous
positive consequences. First, this decision will legitimize tribal court
proceedings. Tribal courts, at least those in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
should be on notice that their decisions in cases involving nonmember
defendants can be reviewed by the U.S. federal courts. This will not only
incentivize a transparent and fair process in tribal court cases, but it will
also incentivize nonmember defendants to appear at tribal courts to present
a defense on the merits. Second, nonmember defendants can take comfort
in the fact that any tribal court judgment issued against them can be
reviewed by a federal court under the doctrine of comity. Thus, a tribal
court judgment will never be enforced by a federal court if the tribal court
190. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348–49 (1816).
191. Id.
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lacked jurisdiction or if the defendant was denied due process of law. 192
This means that, even before tribal courts, nonmember defendants will still
enjoy due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The decision to
find a substantial question of federal law in Coeur d’Alene will benefit the
tribal courts’ legal process without depriving nonmember defendants of any
of their legal protections.
VII. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit properly decided that an action to recognize and
enforce a tribal court’s award against nonmembers falls within the grant of
federal question jurisdiction afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Coeur
d’Alene Tribe’s sovereignty has existed since time immemorial; it “flows
through American history in a timeless river, without beginning or end.” 193
But that inherent sovereignty is not unlimited, assuredly so in regard to
nonmembers. The federal government and the American Indian tribes have
a long, complicated history. Because of this “unique relationship with
Indian tribes,”194 federal courts have the power to hear claims for the
recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments against nonmember
defendants.

192. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 (AM. L. INST. 1986)).
193. Sovereignty, supra note 60.
194. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019).
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